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Introduction		Following	 Easton’s	 (1965)	 conceptual	 framework	 discussed	 in	 the	 introductory	chapter,	a	hierarchical	relationship	exists	between	three	objects	of	support:	output	support,	 support	 for	 institutions,	 and	 support	 for	 the	 community.	 The	 latter	 two	objects	 of	 support	 are	 examined	 in	 turn	 in	 two	 subsequent	 chapters	 on	 trust	 in	European	political	institutions	and	the	relationship	between	citizenship	and	identity	in	 the	European	Community.	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 first	 object	 of	 support	 –	support	derived	from	the	accrued	material	benefits	of	EU	membership.	Public	 perceptions	 of	 benefits	 accruing	 from	 EU	 membership	 have	 been	explained	 previously	 in	 terms	 of	 national	 economic	 circumstances	 (economic	growth	 rates,	 inflation,	 unemployment,	 share	 of	 intra-EU	 trade,	 and	 EU	contributions	to	the	national	budgets),	subjective	evaluation	of	economic	well-being	(the	‘feel-good’	factor),	and	socialization	(duration	of	membership	in	the	EU)	(Marsh	1999).	The	wider	 literature	on	support	 for	the	EU	is	generally	consistent	with	this	set	of	results,	suggesting	a	strong	utilitarian	basis	for	such	judgments.	However,	 in	recent	years,	identity	(or	the	Haasian	‘shifting	loyalties’	in	general)	became	the	focus	of	much	theoretical	and	empirical	research	aiming	to	explain	public	perceptions	of	European	 integration.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 proclaimed	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 general	public	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 ‘identity	 rules’:	 while	 utilitarian	 factors	 are	 taken	 into	account	 by	 citizens	 ‘the	 conceptions	 of	 group	 membership	 are	 more	 powerful’	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2004).		
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This	 chapter	 assesses	 the	 extent	 of	 utilitarian	 roots	 for	 the	 perception	 of	 benefits	from	membership	in	EU	member	states	comprising	different	accession	waves	over	the	 period	 from	 1984	 to	 2005.	 We	 examine	 economically	 driven	 explanations	provided	in	the	literature	and	evaluate	whether	they	remain	consistent	over	a	much	longer	 time	 period	 than	 utilized	 in	 any	 of	 the	 previous	 studies.	 The	 time	 period	covered	includes	a	major	qualitative	change	in	the	nature	and	functioning	of	the	EU,	and	 consequently	 possible	 changes	 in	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 people	 approve	 EU	outputs	as	well	as	the	basis	on	which	they	do	so.			
Previous	research		Support	 for	 European	 integration	 is	 affected,	 and	 at	 least	 partially	 driven,	 by	 the	anticipated	benefits	of	European	integration	to	individuals	in	member	states	(Gabel	1998b).	 The	 influence	 of	 policy	 output	 on	 the	 level	 of	 both	 general	 and	 specific	support	 for	a	political	system	has	been	highlighted	 in	Easton	(1965).	As	argued	 in	Marsh	(1999),	 the	 functionalist,	and	 later	neo-functionalist,	central	premise	 is	 that	well-performing	 institutions	 are	 invested	with	more	 authority;	 that	 is,	 states	 and	pseudo-states,	like	the	EU,	are	judged	on	their	relative	effectiveness	in	performing	a	service.	Within	the	neo-functionalist	approach,	the	assumption	is	that	performance	is	 being	 evaluated	 via	 its	 impact	 on	 functional	 social	 groups.	 More	 specifically,	citizens	 in	social	groups	 that	expect	 to	receive	benefits	 from	EU	policy	output	will	
 4 
welcome	the	integration	process	and	the	economic	liberalization	associated	with	it.	Anderson	 and	 Reichert	 (1996),	 Gabel	 and	 Palmer	 (1995),	 and	 Gabel	 (1998a,	 b)	showed	 that	 citizens	 with	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 an	integrated	 economic	 environment	 (like	 the	 working	 class	 and	 generally	 citizens	with	lower	levels	of	human	capital)	are	likely	to	be	negatively	predisposed	towards	the	EU.	At	 the	same	time,	people	with	high	 levels	of	human	capital	(education	and	specific	 occupational	 skills)	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 positively	 predisposed	 towards	 closer	integration.	However,	 if	 functional	 social	 groups	are	 re-defined	within	a	European	rather	than	a	national	context,	national	governments	can	be	viewed	as	playing	a	role	of	 mediating	 institutions	 with	 people	 pressing	 national	 governments	 for	 more	benefits	for	their	countries	from	the	EU	(Marsh	1999).		The	most	direct	form	of	benefit	consists	of	transfer	payments	made	from	the	EU	 budget,	 where	 citizens	 of	 countries	 that	 are	 net	 beneficiaries	 of	 EU	 transfers	would	be	more	supportive	of	the	EU	than	citizens	of	donor	countries	(Anderson	and	Reichert	 1996;	 Brinegar,	 Jolly,	 and	 Kitschelt	 2004;	 Hooghe	 and	 Marks	 2004;	Medrano	2003;	Whitten,	Gabel,	and	Palmer	1996).	A	related	utilitarian	perspective	focuses	on	another	aspect	of	direct	cost/benefit	calculations,	 the	existing	extent	of	economic	 integration.	 This	 has	 been	 operationalized	 in	 several	 aggregate	 level	studies	 as	 the	 proportion	 of	 trade	 with	 EU	 countries	 in	 total	 trade	 of	 a	 country	(Anderson	and	Reichert	1996;	Bednar,	Ferejohn,	and	Garrett	1996;	Eichenberg	1999;	Eichenberg	 and	 Dalton	 1993;	 Gabel	 and	 Palmer	 1995;	 Gabel	 and	 Whitten	 1997;	Marsh	1999;	Palmer	and	Gabel	1999).		This	sort	of	utilitarian	consideration	could	be	seen	as	a	very	direct	feature	of	EU	integration.		
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In	addition	to	such	direct	benefits,	there	is	a	second	economic	explanation	of	public	 support	 for	 European	 integration	 that	 bases	 its	 account	 on	 more	 indirect	influences	 on	 perceptions.	 This	 extends	 the	 logic	 of	 comparative	 studies	 that	 link	macroeconomic	 conditions	 to	 citizen	 approval	 of	 government	 performance	(Eichenberg	 1999)	 to	 explain	 how	national	 economic	 circumstances	 can	 influence	perceptions	of	the	EU.	It	is	assumed	that	people	perceive	national	economies	to	be	affected	by	the	EU	policy	output,	and	base	their	evaluations	of	EU	effectiveness	on	the	 performance	 of	 their	 national	 economies.	 Evidence	 for	 this	 indirect	 political	economic	 model	 of	 EU	 support	 has	 been	 presented	 in	 a	 number	 of	 studies	(Anderson	and	Kaltenthaler	1996;	Bednar,	Ferejohn,	and	Garrett	1996;	Eichenberg	1999;	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	1993;	Marsh	1999).	Duch	and	Taylor	(1997)	show	that	the	 link	 between	 economy	 and	 public	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 is	 the	 result	 of	 citizens’	evaluation	 of	 the	 national	 economy.	 Although	 evidence	 is	 not	 consistent	 due	 to	different	 model	 specifications,	 several	 studies	 found	 a	 negative	 relationship	between	 public	 support	 for	 integration	 and	 inflation	 (Anderson	 and	 Kaltenthaler	1996;	Bednar,	Ferejohn,	and	Garrett	1996;	Eichenberg	1999;	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	1993),	 although	 Palmer	 and	 Gabel	 (1999)	 found	 no	 significant	 relationship.	Unemployment	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 have	 a	 weak	 relationship	 (Anderson	 and	Reichert	 1996;	 Bednar,	 Ferejohn,	 and	 Garrett	 1996),	 while	 the	 economic	 growth	rate	 is	 weakly	 positively	 related	 (Anderson	 and	 Reichert	 1996;	 Eichenberg	 and	Dalton	 1993).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Gabel	 and	 Whitten	 (1997)	 found	 no	 significant	relationship	between	 inflation,	unemployment,	 and	economic	growth	and	 citizens’	support	for	EU	integration.		
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In	the	same	vein,	a	related	explanation	positing	a	different	mechanism,	but	a	similar	pattern	of	association,	focuses	on	the	fact	that	citizens	rely	on	domestic	cues	(proxies)	when	formulating	their	attitude	towards	the	EU	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2005)	as,	typically,	they	are	neither	interested	in,	nor	informed	about,	the	EU.	Evaluations	of	 the	EU	can	be	 contextualized	 in	domestic	politics,	which	provides	 shortcuts	 for	the	 respondents	 when	 answering	 survey	 questions	 on	 Europe	 (Anderson	 1998;	Franklin,	Marsh,	 and	McLaren	 1994;	 Franklin,	 van	 der	 Eijk,	 and	Marsh	 1995;	 Ray	2003;	Rohrschneider	2002;	Sánchez-Cuenca	2000).		All	 economic	 explanations	 of	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 can	 be	 generalized	 as	representing	the	relationship	between	a	poor	economic	situation	in	a	country	and	a	negative	 perception	 of	 its	 citizens	 and	 between	 a	 good	 economic	 situation	 and	positive	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU.	 Arguably,	 this	 is	 weakened	 by	 the	 mediation	 of	national	political	competition,	since	government	might	well	 seek	 to	 take	credit	 for	good	times	and	blame	the	EU	for	bad	ones	(Marsh	1999).	However,	the	opposition	may	argue	 that	 the	government	ought	 to	 take	 the	blame	 for	bad	 times	and	should	not	 always	 take	 credit	 for	 good	 times,	 so	 it	 is	 reasonable,	 even	 allowing	 for	 such	mediation,	 to	hypothesize	a	relationship	between	 local	economic	performance	and	EU	support.	However,	alternative	hypotheses,	which	suggest	a	negative	rather	than	a	positive	relationship	with	some	economic	variables,	are	also	plausible.	When	the	national	economy	is	actually	doing	well,	people	might	be	more	inclined	to	see	the	EU	as	 an	 unnecessary	 interference.	 When	 it	 is	 doing	 badly,	 they	 look	 to	 the	 EU	 for	salvation.		
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A	third	explanation	is	couched	in	terms	of	socialization.	Arguably,	it	will	take	time	 for	people	 to	see	benefits.	Many	economic	explanations	are	supplemented	by	the	suggestion	that	membership	will	bring	about	more	positive	 feelings	with	time.	This	‘socialization’	argument	may	be	seen	to	depend	on	the	accumulation	of	outputs,	but	could	also	stem	from	the	greater	awareness	of	 the	EU	that	comes	 from	 longer	membership	(Anderson	1995;	Anderson	and	Reichert	1996;	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	1993;	Inglehart	and	Rabier	1978).	For	 some	analysts,	 all	 utilitarian	 accounts	 are	 strictly	 limited.	The	 research	agenda	 in	 the	early	2000s	has	been	dominated	by	non-utilitarian	explanations	 for	why	citizens	would	perceive	the	EU	in	a	positive	light,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	their	 economy	 performs	well,	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 identity.	 It	 is	 argued	that	 the	 EU	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 non-material	 well-being.	 In	 particular,	‘national	 identity’	 has	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 constraint	 on	 citizens’	 support	 for	European	 integration	 (Carey	 2002;	 Christin	 and	 Trechsel	 2002;	 McLaren	 2002;	Medrano	 and	 Gutiérrez	 2001;	 Van	 Kersbergen	 2000).	 Although	 several	 authors	identified	 strong	 national	 attachment	 as	 being	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 desire	 for	further	 European	 integration	 (Citrin	 and	 Sides	 2004;	 Haesly	 2001;	 Marks	 1998;	Marks	 and	 Llamazares	 forthcoming.;	 Risse	 2002),	 citizens	 with	 an	 ‘exclusively’	national	 identity	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 perceive	 European	 integration	 as	 a	 threat	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2004,	2005).	Risse	(2005)	points	out	that	an	identity	shift	from	the	 national	 to	 the	 European	 level	 has	 traditionally	 been	 linked	 to	 the	 material	benefits	 received	 through	 European	 integration,	 and	 later	 augmented	 by	 the	concept	 of	 socialization,	 i.e.	 the	 slow	 embedding	 of	 Europeanness	 in	 national	
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identities.	This	particular	non-utilitarian	explanation	is	picked	up	in	two	subsequent	chapters,	and,	 in	particular,	 in	 the	chapter	by	Thomassen	and	Bäck,	while	here	we	focus	largely	on	utilitarian	explanations.	More	 generally	 are	 suggestions	 that	 the	potency	of	 some	explanations	may	vary	 across	 countries.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 public	 support	 for	 European	integration	in	the	new	member	states	may	be	defined	by	people’s	desire	to	cement	democratic	 transition	 in	 their	 countries	 (Rohrschneider	 2002).	 In	 fact,	Rohrschneider	 and	Whitefield	 (2006)	 show	 that	 in	 new	member	 states,	 economic	explanations,	 while	 still	 playing	 a	 role,	 are	 less	 important	 than	 concerns	 about	democratic	performance,	values,	and	identity	in	shaping	public	perception	of	the	EU.	More	 generally,	 countries	 have	 probably	 joined	 the	 EU	 for	 different	 reasons,	 and	publics	 in	 those	 countries	 have	 been	 encouraged	 to	 see	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 EU	 in	different	lights.	In	Ireland,	for	instance,	material	benefits	were	always	prominent	in	campaigns	 about	 EU	 membership	 and	 in	 subsequent	 referendums	 on	 further	integration.	Yet	 for	countries	 joining	 later,	even	 in	second	wave	countries	–	Spain,	Portugal	and	Greece	–	the	link	with	liberal	democratic	Europe	was	an	important	way	to	strengthen	democracy,	an	argument	also	made	in	the	new	member	states	joining	in	2004.	This	obviously	poses	the	question	of	how	far	any	utilitarian	account	will	be	equally	persuasive	for	all	member	states,	a	question	we	will	address	in	this	chapter.	A	 second	 source	 of	 variation	 is	 time.	 The	 EU	 now	 is	 a	 rather	 different	institution	to	what	it	was	twenty-five	years	ago,	when	the	second	wave	of	accession	took	place,	let	alone	fifty	years	ago	when	it	was	founded.	It	has	many	more	powers	over	many	more	policy	areas:	 in	effect,	 there	are	more	outputs,	and	many	of	these	
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are	 not	 economic	 ones.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested,	 most	 recently	 by	 Eichenberg	 and	Dalton	(2007),	that	this	has	consequences	for	our	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	EU	 support,	 with	 utilitarian	 calculations	 having	 much	 less	 significance	 in	 more	recent	 years.	 Therefore,	we	will	 also	 examine	 the	 stability	 over	 time	 of	 economic	and	some	non-economic	explanations.			
Public	perceptions	of	benefits		There	are	a	number	of	measures	of	public	perceptions	of	the	EU	and	its	institutions	available	 from	 the	 Eurobarometer,	 but	 relatively	 few	 that	 have	 been	 asked	repeatedly	over	a	long	period.	The	most	appropriate	for	the	purpose	here,	where	the	objective	is	to	consider	how	citizens	view	the	outputs	of	the	Union,	is	the	so-called	‘benefits’	 question:	 ‘taking	 everything	 into	 consideration,	 would	 you	 say	 that	[country]	has	on	balance	benefited	or	not	from	being	a	member	of	the	EU?’	This	is	one	of	a	number	of	items	that	seem	to	tap	aspects	of	overall	support	for	integration,	the	 others	 being	 questions	 tapping	 support	 for	 ‘unification’,	 asking	 would	respondents	be	sorry	if	the	European	Union	were	to	be	scrapped,	and	whether	their	country’s	membership	of	the	EU	was	a	good	thing.	The	benefits	question	seems	best	suited	to	analyze	policy	outcomes	–	the	basis	of	what	Easton	called	‘specific’	support	–	while	it	has	been	argued	that	the	unification	question	best	measures	what	Easton	called	 ‘diffuse’	 support.	 That	 said,	 it	 is	 also	 easy	 to	 exaggerate	 the	 real	 difference	
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between	 these	 four	 questions,	 as	 each	 may	 be	 shown	 to	 tap	 a	 common	 attitude	towards	the	regime	of	the	EU	(for	a	good	review	and	analysis	see	Scheuer	2005:	3-7	and	 49-50).	 Certainly	 there	 have	 been	 no	 successful	 attempts	 to	 validate	 these	questions	 as	 operationalizations	 of	 the	 different	 Eastonian	 concepts.	 However,	 in	terms	 simply	 of	 face	 validity,	 the	 benefits	 question	 seems	 best	 suited	 to	 our	 task	here,	 and	 while	 a	 more	 broadly	 based	 measure	 might	 well	 be	 preferable	 as	 an	overall	indicator	of	EU	support,	we	do	not	see	that	it	would	be	a	better	measure	of	outputs.				
<<	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE>>		 Figure	1	 shows	 the	overall	 level	of	perceived	 (national)	benefits	 across	 the	member	states	since	1984,	the	first	year	for	which	the	data	are	available.	This	 is	a	cross-national	average.	It	is	evident	that	the	perceptions	of	the	EU	as	beneficial	have	followed	a	cyclical	pattern.	They	grew	steadily	more	positive	until	1991,	only	to	fall	equally	 steadily	 for	 the	 next	 five	 years,	 after	 which	 they	 have	 again	 risen	 fairly	steadily,	without	 regaining	 the	 heights	 of	 1991,	when	 an	 average	 of	 66%	 in	 each	country	 saw	 the	EU	as	beneficial	 for	 their	 country.	However,	 the	bars	around	 this	line	 indicate	 that	 this	 average	 has	 quite	 a	 high	 standard	 error,	 indicating	 a	 lot	 of	disparity	across	countries.	 In	 fact	 it	 seems	 that	disparity	 increased	after	1991	and	became	smaller	only	a	decade	later.			
<<FIGURE	2	ABOUT	HERE>>	
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	 Of	 course,	 the	 membership	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 not	 been	 consistent	 across	 this	period,	as	new	members	joined	in	the	1980s,	the	1990s	and	most	recently	in	2004.	In	figures	2-4	we	show	the	trends	in	each	of	the	various	waves	of	accession.	We	are	looking	here	to	see	how	well	member	states	in	each	wave	fit	with	the	overall	trend.	The	 original	 six	 (Figure	 2)	 show	 significant	 variations	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 positive	perception,	 but	 most	 countries	 follow	 broadly	 the	 same	 trend.	 The	 only	 clear	exception	 is	 the	 Netherlands	 where	 support	 has	 declined	 steadily	 from	 the	 early	1990s	and	shows	no	sign	of	recovering.			
<<	FIGURE	3	ABOUT	HERE>>		 Figure	 3	 focuses	 on	 states	 in	 the	 enlargement	 waves	 prior	 to	 2004.2	The	states	 in	 the	 first	 wave	 show	 rather	 different	 patterns:	 in	 Ireland	 and	 Denmark	perceptions	 are	 increasingly	 positive	 while	 in	 the	 UK	 the	 pattern	 echoes	 the	 EU	average,	 although	 perceptions	 are	 much	 more	 negative.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 states	joining	in	the	1980s	all	show	significant	increases	in	positive	perceptions	in	the	first	few	years.	This	 increase	has	 leveled	off	 in	Greece	and	Portugal,	but	has	 continued	upwards	 in	 Spain.	 In	 the	 1990s	 accession	 states,	 perceptions	 are	 much	 more	negative,	and	a	trend	upwards	from	the	late	1990s	can	be	observed	only	in	Sweden.			
                                                2	Here	we	designate	four	enlargement	waves	as	follows:	1st	wave	(Ireland,	Denmark,	the	UK),	2nd	 wave	 (Greece,	 Portugal,	 Spain),	 3rd	 wave	 (Austria,	 Finland,	 Sweden),	 and	 4th	 wave	(Cyprus,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Estonia,	 Hungary,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	Malta,	 Poland,	 Slovakia,	 and	Slovenia).	
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<<FIGURE	4	ABOUT	HERE>>		 Finally,	the	ten	new	accession	states	(Figure	4)	follow	diverse	patterns	with	some	striking	variations	in	responses	over	the	short	time	over	which	data	have	been	gathered3.	 In	 general,	 most	 started	 below	 the	 EU	 average,	 and	 show	 upward	 or	stable	 trends	with	support	 trending	downwards	 in	Cyprus,	Hungary	and,	perhaps,	Slovenia.			
<<FIGURE	5	ABOUT	HERE>>		 Figure	 5	 shows	 a	 single	 trend	 line	 for	 each	 of	 these	 five	 sets	 of	 states.	 It	demonstrates	that	in	broad	terms	there	is	a	similar	pattern	over	time	for	each	set:	a	rise	until	the	early	1990s,	followed	by	a	clear	decline	(wave	1	may	be	an	exception	here),	and	then	a	recovery	from	the	late	1990s.	In	other	words,	the	sort	of	pattern	observed	for	the	EU	25	as	a	whole	 in	Figure	1	 is	not	much	affected	by	the	varying	composition	of	the	EU.	In	particular,	the	decline	in	the	early	1990s	was	amplified	by	the	 accession	 of	 Sweden,	 Finland	 and	 Austria,	 but	 exists	 independently	 of	 that	compositional	change.	Moreover,	the	inclusion	of	ten	new	states	in	the	2000s	is	not	responsible	for	the	recovery	of	support.	It	has	been	suggested	that	there	is	growing	convergence	in	support	for	the	EU	across	the	member	states	(Eichenberg	and	Dalton	2007).	This	is	not	really	very	apparent	in	Figure	5.	Support	levels	were	in	fact	more	
                                                3	The	 question	 asked	 by	 Eurobarometer	 in	 these	 countries	 before	 accession	 concerns	‘advantage’	 rather	 than	 ‘benefit’	 perception.	 See	 discussion	 in	 the	 next	 section	 for	 more	details.	
 13 
similar	around	the	time	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1992	than	they	have	been	over	the	last	few	years,	even	leaving	aside	the	states	in	the	third	wave	of	accession,	who	certainly	increase	the	degree	of	diversity.			
<<FIGURE	6	ABOUT	HERE>>		 In	 fact,	 as	 Figure	 6	 shows	most	 clearly,	 diversity	 in	 perceptions	 of	 benefit	from	the	EU	also	seems	cyclical.	After	a	short	rise	and	fall	initially,	the	lowest	level	of	diversity	 was	 in	 1990-1991.	 After	 that,	 diversity	 increased	 until	 2000,	 when	 it	returned	almost	to	the	level	of	1992	(Figure	6).	It	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	 diversity	 in	 terms	 of	 countries’	perceptions	of	the	EU,	both	in	terms	of	different	levels	at	any	one	time,	and	in	terms	of	 the	 changes	 in	 levels	over	 time,	with	Spain	and	 Ireland	showing	a	 considerable	increase	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 a	 marked	 decrease	 in	 positive	 perceptions	 of	 the	impact	of	EU	membership.	What	we	seek	to	do	in	the	next	section	is	to	explain	some	of	that	diversity.			
Explaining	diversity	and	change		As	we	have	seen	in	our	summary	of	previous	explanations	of	EU	support,	there	are	several	 different	 explanations	 that	 have	 been	 examined,	 each	 of	 which	 has	 been	
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consistent	 with	 some	 of	 the	 evidence	 put	 forward.	 Here	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 three	explanations	with	the	separate	question	of	identity	picked	up	in	later	chapters.	The	first	 explanation	 considered	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 direct	 economic	 benefits	 of	membership,	 such	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 transfer	 payments;	 the	 second	 explanation	concerns	the	more	indirect	benefits	evident	in	national	economic	indicators,	such	as	growth	and	employment;	 and	 the	 third	 is	 the	 impact	of	 time,	or	 socialization.	The	basic	model	to	be	estimated	is:		
Benefit	=	 	intra-EU	trade	as	%	of	all	trade	+	
	net	budget	transfers	+	
	unemployment	+		
inflation	+		
log	(GDP	per	capita	in	PPP)	+	
log	(number	of	years	in	the	EU)	+	
country	(full	set	of	country	dummies)	+	
u		 The	dependent	variable	is	constructed	as	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	considered	 that	 their	 country	 benefits	 from	 the	 EU	membership.	While	 there	 are	alternative	 ways	 of	 deriving	 a	 measure	 from	 the	 benefit	 question,	 such	 as	subtracting	 negative	 from	 positive	 responses,	 we	 chose	 this	 as	 it	 is	 the	 most	straightforward	 and	 less	 inclined	 to	 vary	 wildly,	 which	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 most	obvious	 alternative.	 In	 addition,	 this	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	 reduce	 the	 random	
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variation	 in	 our	 dependent	 variable	 measure	 that	 may	 have	 resulted	 from	aggregation	 (subtracting	 negative	 from	 positive	 evaluations)	 and	 alternative	handling	of	the	‘don’t	know’	category	in	the	data.4	For	the	EU	15	member	states	the	data	 are	 taken	 from	 the	 Eurobarometer	 trend	 file	 (1984-2002),	 and	 individual	Eurobarometers	from	2002	to	2005.	For	the	new	member	states	the	data	are	from	the	 Candidate	 Countries	 Eurobarometers	 (2001-2003)	 and	 from	 the	 general	Eurobarometers	for	2004	and	2005.	Pre-accession,	the	‘benefit’	question	was	asked	as	‘advantage’,	but	it	is	treated	as	the	same	question	here.		The	data	on	budgetary	transfers	are	taken	from	the	Statistical	Annex	to	the	European	Commission	report	“Allocation	of	2005	EU	expenditure	by	Member	State”	(Tables	 3f	 and	 4f	 therein),	 which	 covers	 expenditure	 allocation	 from	 1992-2005.	Time-series	 were	 extended	 from	 1984-1992	 based	 on	 the	 annual	 reports	 by	 the	European	Court	of	Auditors	in	the	Official	Journal.	Other	economic	data	are	largely	from	 Eurostat,	 supplemented	 where	 necessary	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 new	 member	states)	from	the	World	Bank	World	Development	Indicators	(WDI).	Unemployment	(as	percentage	of	total	labor	force)	data	for	all	countries	are	from	WDI.	Data	for	pre-unification	 Germany	 are	 for	 West	 Germany	 and	 taken	 from	 the	 OECD	 Main	Economic	Indicators	(historical	series).	The	consumer	price	index	is	used	here	as	a	measure	 of	 inflation.	 Personal	 income	 is	 operationalized	 as	 GDP	 per	 capita	 in	purchasing	 power	 parity	 (in	 current	 international	 dollars)	 and	 following	 general	practice	in	the	field	is	rescaled	here	as	a	natural	logarithm.	Intra-EU	trade	is	the	data	from	Eurostat	on	the	share	of	exports	to	and	imports	from	the	EU	member	states	in	
                                                4	We	thank	Cees	van	der	Eijk	for	pointing	this	out	to	us.	
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the	total	trade	of	a	country.	Socialization	is	operationalized	as	the	number	of	years	since	the	Treaty	of	Rome	for	the	original	six	EU	members,	and	the	number	of	years	since	accession	for	all	other	countries.	This	analysis	follows	that	of	Marsh	(1999)	by	operationalizing	socialization	as	a	natural	 logarithm	of	 the	membership	 time.	This	allows	 the	 effect	 to	 diminish	 over	 time,	 a	 logical	 necessity	 since	 support	 as	measured	here	cannot	exceed	100%.	This	is	different	from	other	operationalizations	used	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 allow	 socialization	 to	 grow	 in	 an	 unbounded	 way	 by	taking	simply	the	number	of	years	that	a	country	has	been	a	member	of	the	EU	(e.g.,	Anderson	and	Reichert	1996;	Gabel	1998b).		Data	summary	statistics	is	provided	in	the	Appendix.		
Analysis		It	has	now	become	customary	 in	political	science	to	use	the	Beck	and	Katz	(1995)	panel	corrected	standard	errors	(PCSE)	method	estimating	models	with	time-series	cross-section	 (TSCS)	 structure.	 Quite	 often	 researchers	 use	 PCSE	without	 giving	 a	second	 thought	 to	 underlying	 assumptions	 or	 justifying	 their	 estimation	 method	theoretically.	Simple	citation	of	the	Beck	and	Katz	1995	article	seems	to	suffice.	Neil	Beck	 half-jokingly	 suggests	 that	 P	 in	 PCSE	 has	 become	 understood	 to	 stand	 for	Panacea	 and	 not	 Panel	 (Beck	 2007).	 Practical	 researchers	 have	 been	 repeatedly	warned	 against	 using	 PCSE	method	 as	 a	 quick	 fix	 in	 TSCS	models	 (Beck	 and	Katz	1995,	 1996,	 2004).	 Recent	 analysis	 of	 published	work	 in	 leading	 political	 science	
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journals	presented	in	Wilson	and	Butler	(2007)	shows	that	only	a	relative	minority	heeded	 to	 Beck	 and	 Katz’s	 cautionary	 note.	 Hence,	 we	 discuss	 in	 detail	 several	methodological	 and	 theoretical	 considerations	 justifying	 our	 choice	 of	 estimation	method.	A	 first	 consideration	 is	 the	 obviously	 different	 levels	 of	 positive	 feeling	 in	each	country.	While	we	do	want	 to	explain	such	differences,	 the	existence	of	what	might	 be	 essentially	 national-level	 peculiarities	 could	 bias	 our	 search	 for	 more	general	patterns.	The	normal	solution	is	to	model	this	with	a	fixed	effects	model.	In	such	 models	 the	 set	 of	 independent	 variables	 is	 essentially	 the	 variation	 around	national	 means.	 Because	 it	 is	 a	 fixed	 effects	 model,	 the	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	relationships	between	dependent	and	independent	variables	are	the	same	for	each	country.	We	tested	the	fixed	effects	assumption	of	the	model	against	random	effects	model	 (a	possible	 alternative)	using	 the	Hausman	 test,	 and	 the	 general	 validity	of	fixed	 effects	 using	 standard	 F-test.	 Both	 tests	 support	 estimation	 of	 the	 model	through	a	fixed	effects	specification.	A	 second	 consideration	 is	whether	 the	 series	 themselves	 are	 stationary	 or	not,	as	performing	standard	regression	analysis	on	non-stationary	series	produces	spurious	results	(Greene	2003).	When	a	dependent	variable	and	a	covariate	follow	a	random	walk	 (that	 is,	 the	series	are	not	 stationary),	Granger	and	Newbold	 (1974)	showed	 that	 the	 usual	 t-statistics	 from	 standard	 regression	 technique	 (OLS	regression)	 provide	 spurious	 results.	We	 tested	 the	 data	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 unit	roots,	 but	 found	 no	 significant	 sign	 of	 unit	 root	 processes	 in	 our	 data.	We	 used	 a	Fisher's	 test,	proposed	 in	Maddala	and	Wu	(1999),	which	combines	p-values	 from	
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independent	 unit-root	 tests	 for	 each	 panel.	 It	 is	 based	 on	 p-values	 of	 individual	Augmented	Dickey-Fuller	unit	root	tests	(Dickey	and	Fuller	1979)	and	assumes	that	all	 series	 are	 non-stationary	 under	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 with	 the	 alternative	hypothesis	being	that	at	least	one	series	in	the	panel	is	stationary.	The	test	has	also	been	 suggested	 as	 a	 preferred	 choice	 in	 case	 of	 cross-sectional	 correlation,	 when	standard	 alternatives	 (the	 Levin-Lin	 and	 Im-Pesaran-Shin	 tests)	 are	 invalid	(Maddala	 and	Wu	 1999).	We	 tested	 different	 alternative	 specifications	 of	 the	 test	(with	and	without	the	trend)	but	the	results	are	unchanged.	A	third	consideration	is	the	result	of	our	estimation	on	groups	of	EU	member	states	 after	 each	 accession	 wave.	 Here,	 analogous	 to	 our	 first	 consideration,	peculiarities	 shared	 by	 groups	 of	 accession	 states	 could	 bias	 our	 search	 for	more	general	 patterns	within	 all	 EU	member	 states.	 For	 example,	 countries	 in	 the	 third	accession	wave	(Austria,	Finland,	and	Sweden)	may	share	some	characteristics	that	would	 set	 them	 aside	 from	 the	 EU	 12	 group	 of	member	 states.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	countries	 of	 the	 third	 accession	wave	may	 be	 similar	 in	 certain	 characteristics	 to	Denmark	and	the	UK	from	the	first	accession	wave.	This	similarity	(or	dependence)	within	our	estimation	panels	 (spatial	dependence),	 especially	 in	 combination	with	autocorrelation	in	our	data,	would	bias	standard	errors	in	our	estimation	results	if	ignored.	Our	discussion	 in	 the	 second	 section	 gives	 reason	 to	 expect	 some	 spatial	correlation.	 Under	 the	 assumption	 that	 cross-sectional	 dependence	 is	 caused	 by	unobserved	 common	 factors,	 uncorrelated	 with	 included	 covariates,	 the	 effect	would	 be	 translated	 through	 the	 disturbance	 term.	 In	 that	 case,	 cross-sectional	correlation	 is	 the	average	absolute	value	of	 the	off-diagonal	elements	of	 the	cross-
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sectional	correlation	matrix	of	residuals	(De	Hoyos	and	Sarafidis	2006).	Estimates	of	cross-sectional	 correlation	 in	 our	 data	 range	 between	 0.24	 in	 the	 original	 six	countries	 (the	same	 for	accession	waves	1	and	2),	0.26	 in	wave	3,	0.42	 in	wave	4,	0.34	in	EU	9,	0.374	in	EU12,	0.409	in	EU15,	and	0.421	in	EU25.	This	is	a	descriptive	and	 intuitive	 result	 rather	 than	 a	 useable	 test	 statistic.	 We	 cannot	 resort	 to	 any	spatial	dependence	statistical	tests	due	to	the	particular	structure	of	our	data	(N/T	ratio)	and	generally	small	sample	size5.	However,	cross-sectional	correlation	results	appear	 to	 be	 high	 enough	 to	 suggest	 that	 cross-sectional	 dependence	 may	 be	present	in	our	data	to	a	degree	of	affecting	the	estimation	results.	The	effect	of	cross-sectional	dependence	depends	heavily	on	the	magnitude	of	 cross-panel	 correlation	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 dependence.	 However,	 typically	standard	 fixed-	 and	 random-effects	 estimators	 remain	 consistent,	 but	 inefficient,	and	 estimated	 standard	 errors	 are	 biased	 (Baltagi	 2005).	 In	 particular,	 Beck	 and	Katz	 (1995)	 showed	 that,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 group-wise	 heteroskedasticity	 and	cross-sectional	 and	 temporal	 correlation,	 which	 is	 a	 standard	 situation	 in	 time-series	cross-section	models,	regular	assumptions	about	the	error-term	are	violated,	and	models	estimated	by	 feasible	generalized	 least	 squares	 (standard	approach	 in	such	 circumstances)	 in	 finite	 panels	 produce	 overly	 optimistic	 results	 (anti-conservative),	with	standard	errors	usually	biased	downwards.	Beck	and	Katz	(1995)	propose	a	correction	for	two	of	these	problems	–	group-wise	heteroskedasticity	and	contemporaneous	 correlation	 of	 the	 disturbances	 –	 in	 their	 panel	 corrected	standard	errors	(PCSE)	methodology.		
                                                5	For	an	overview	see	Anselin	(2001).	
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We	 tested	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 temporal	 correlation	 in	 our	 data	 using	 the	Arellano-Bond	 test	 (Arellano	 and	 Bond	 1991)	 and	 the	Wooldridge	 test	 for	 serial	correlation	 in	 the	 errors	 of	 a	 linear	 panel-data	 model	 (Wooldridge	 2002).	 These	tests	suggest	that	autocorrelation	features	in	our	data.	The	PCSE	approach	does	not	correct	 for	 autocorrelation,	 requiring	 it	 to	 be	 corrected	before	 applying	PCSE,	 but	neither	does	it	account	for	temporal	heteroskedasticity	(another	persistent	feature	in	 time-series	data	and	present	 in	our	data	here)	 (Beck	and	Katz	2004;	Kittel	 and	Winner	2005).		One	 popular	 way	 to	 account	 for	 autocorrelation	 is	 by	 including	 lagged	dependent	variables	(LDV)	among	the	covariates	in	PCSE	estimation	model	(Wilson	and	Butler	2007).	However,	if	autocorrelation	is	persistent	after	the	inclusion	of	LDV	the	coefficient	estimates	are	biased	(Beck	and	Katz	1996;	Wilson	and	Butler	2007).	From	 the	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view	 we	 believe	 that	 including	 lagged	 popular	perception	of	the	EU	benefits	(LDV)	is	not	justified	in	our	model.	Moreover,	tests	for	autocorrelation	 in	 PCSE	 estimation	 of	 our	 model	 with	 LDV	 included	 among	covariates	 point	 to	 remaining	 autocorrelation,	 potentially	 biasing	 coefficient	estimates.		Taking	into	account	considerations	discussed	above,	and	the	fact	that	we	are	interested	 above	 all	 in	 the	 temporal	 component	 of	 the	model,	 we	 opt	 for	 a	 fixed	effects	model	 estimated	by	ordinary	 least	 squares	with	Driscoll	 and	Kraay	 (1998)	standard	 errors.	 Driscoll	 and	 Kraay	 (1998)	 proposed	 a	 nonparametric	 covariance	matrix	estimator,	which	produces	heteroskedasticity	and	autocorrelation	consistent	(HAC)	 standard	 errors	 that	 are	 robust	 to	 general	 forms	 of	 temporal	 and	 spatial	
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dependence.	 Furthermore,	 Driscoll	 and	 Kraay	 (1998)	 show	 with	 evidence	 from	Monte	Carlo	experiments	that	their	estimator	is	independent	of	the	cross-sectional	dimension	of	the	data,	which	is	particularly	important	to	political	scientists	usually	operating	with	 finite	 samples.	Hoechle	 (2006),	who	adopted	 the	estimator	 for	use	with	unbalanced	panels,	shows	that	in	the	presence	of	spatial	correlation,	which	we	suspect	exists	in	our	data,	the	Driscoll-Kraay	estimator	performs	much	better	than	standard	existing	estimators.	Generally,	Driscoll	and	Kraay	(1998)	apply	Newey	and	West	 (1987)	 HAC	 correction	 to	 a	 sequence	 of	 cross-averages	 of	 the	 moment	conditions	(Hoechle	2006).	Here	we	use	the	default	 lag	 length	of	two,	which	is	the	first	step	in	Newey	and	West	(1994).	We	 have	 estimated	 the	 model	 for	 the	 full	 EU	 25	 as	 well	 as	 for	 sets	 of	countries	 comprising	 the	EU	after	 each	enlargement	wave	 (i.e.	 EU	6,	EU	9,	EU	12,	and	EU	15).	This	allows	us	to	see	how	robust	the	findings	are	across	different	sets	of	states	 without	 having	 to	 estimate	 models	 on	 what	 would	 be	 very	 small	 samples.	Estimates	are	shown	in	Table	1.	A	graphical	representation	of	the	results	reported	is	presented	in	Figure	7,	which	indicates	the	confidence	interval	for	the	coefficient	for	each	 variable	 and	 for	 each	 of	 the	 sets	 of	 EU	 member	 states.	 The	 results	 in	 the	graphical	presentation	are	of	the	estimates	on	standardized	variables,	which	makes	it	 easy	 to	 see	 how	 the	 magnitude	 as	 well	 as	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 coefficients	change	with	the	enlargement	of	the	EU.			
<<	TABLE	1	ABOUT	HERE>>		
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<<	FIGURE	7	ABOUT	HERE>>		 For	 the	EU	25	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 a	 combination	of	direct	 and	 indirect	economic	 effects,	 as	 well	 as	 socialization,	 all	 go	 some	 way	 to	 explain	 popular	responses	 to	 the	 EU’s	 outputs.	 There	 are	 significant	 direct	 effects.	 Transfer	payments	 via	 the	 EU	 budget	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 trade	 is	 intra-EU	 are	 both	significant.	 It	also	seems	to	be	 the	case	 that	people	respond	to	domestic	economic	considerations	 and	 are	 inclined	 to	 give	 the	 EU	 credit	 for	 ‘good	 times’.	 The	unemployment	 variable	 is	 significant,	 as	 is	 income,	 but	 inflation,	 which	 has	 been	found	to	be	significant	in	several	other	studies,	is	not	significant	here.	Socialization	is	 also	 important,	 with	 the	 accumulation	 of	 years	 of	membership	 associated	with	more	positive	feelings.		These	findings	hold	in	large	part	for	each	set	of	EU	member	states,	although	there	are	exceptions.	The	most	important	is	that	transfer	payments	matter	only	for	the	 larger	number	of	 countries	 and	not	 for	 the	EU	6,	 EU	9	 and	EU	12.	This	 is	 not	simply	 that	 similar	 results	 become	 insignificant	 when	 the	 N	 is	 smaller.	 The	coefficients	 themselves	 are	much	 smaller,	 and	 negative	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 EU	9.	 A	second	exception	is	the	income	variable,	but	only	the	EU	6	really	looks	different	here,	and	even	then	the	difference	between	the	coefficient	for	the	EU	25	and	that	for	the	EU	6	is	only	just	significant.	The	third	concerns	socialization.	The	effect	is	strongest	for	the	EU	6,	although	it	is	not	positive	as	we	expected,	but	negative.	Positive	effects	are	most	marked	for	the	EU	12,	but	generally	positive	for	all	but	the	EU	6.		
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The	 model	 seeks	 to	 explain	 the	 movement	 around	 the	 average	 public	perception	of	the	EU	benefit	within	each	member	state.	The	R2	is	.34	indicating	that	34%	 of	 the	 variation	 within	 countries	 over	 time	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 model.	 This	pattern	holds	across	all	 sets	of	EU	member	states,	but	 it	 is	evident	 that	 it	 is	much	better	for	EU	6	countries,	where	R2	is	.46,	than	for	the	EU	9,	where	it	drops	to	.17.	In	essence	 this	 would	 suggest	 that	 the	 utilitarian	 model	 is	 best	 suited	 to	 explain	popular	 perceptions	 of	 EU	 outputs	 within	 the	 six	 founding	 countries,	 but	 it	 does	hold	up	reasonably	evenly	for	all	the	remaining	sets	of	EU	member	states,	with	the	possible	exception	of	the	first	wave:	Denmark,	Ireland	and	the	UK.6			Eichenberg	and	Dalton	 (2007)	 argue	 that	utilitarian	 concerns	have	become	less	important,	and	place	the	Maastricht	Treaty	at	the	heart	of	that	change.	Thus	we	should	 in	essence	face	two	distinct	periods	 in	the	history	of	EU.	This	suggests	that	the	model	 estimates	 should	 be	 significantly	 different	 before	 and	 after	Maastricht.	We	test	this	proposition	by	estimating	the	structural	stability	of	our	model	over	two	periods:	the	first	being	the	time	up	to	and	including	1993	and	the	second	being	after	1993.	In	order	to	test	structural	stability	of	the	model,	we	create	dummy	variables	for	 two	 periods	 (1984-1993	 and	 1994-2005)	 and	 interactions	 of	 these	 period	dummies	with	all	 our	 covariates.	We	estimate	a	 general	model,	which	 includes	all	our	covariates	for	full	time	sample	and	interactions	for	a	second	sub-sample	(this	is	more	 numerically	 stable	 than	 estimating	 a	model	 with	 interactions	 for	 both	 sub-samples).	This	fully	interacted	model	is	fitted	for	our	consistent	spatial	sub-samples	(i.e.,	groups	of	EU	member	states	after	each	accession	wave:	EU6,	EU9,	EU12,	EU15,	
                                                6	It	seems	that	the	weaker	fit	for	EU	9	group	of	countries	is	due	to	weakness	of	socialization	in	that	group,	and	to	a	particularly	poor	fit	for	one	country:	Ireland.	
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EU25).	We	then	conduct	a	Wald	test	for	a	linear	hypothesis	that	parameters	in	the	second	temporal	sub-sample	equal	the	first	sub-sample.	This	test	is	equivalent	to	a	Chow	test	for	structural	break.	We	find	that	for	the	EU	6	group	of	countries	the	model	has	been	structurally	stable	across	these	two	time	periods.	That	is,	estimates	of	parameters	do	not	seem	to	differ	(in	statistical	terms)	between	their	values	before	and	after	the	Maastricht	Treaty.	However,	there	is	structural	change	in	the	way	the	utilitarian	model	explains	people’s	benefit	perception	in	other	groups	of	EU	member	states	(EU	9,	EU	12,	EU	15,	and	EU	25).	However,	when	we	look	at	the	stability	of	the	individual	parameter,	rather	 than	 in	 the	set	of	parameters	as	a	whole,	only	socialization	(not	 for	EU	12)	and	 transfers	 differ	 significantly	 in	 their	 values	 before	 and	 after	 Maastricht.	 In	general	then,	while	we	agree	with	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	(2007)	that	Maastricht	has	significantly	altered	public	perception	of	the	EU,	we	find	little	evidence	that	most	of	the	utilitarian	factors	in	the	model,	have	a	different	impact	after	1993.				
Conclusions	
	This	chapter	explored	the	perceptions	of	EU	outputs	within	the	mass	public,	asking	how	much	these	have	varied	across	time	and	space	and	how	far	we	can	explain	that	variation	 by	 reference	 to	 objective	 considerations	 of	material	 gain	 as	 opposed	 to	non-utilitarian	considerations	such	as	 local	national	 identities.	We	certainly	do	see	
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changes	 in	 perceptions	 across	 time.	 In	 broad	 terms,	 perceptions	 of	 benefits	 have	first	 risen,	 then	 fallen,	 and	 now	 seem	 to	 be	 rising	 again.	 This	 is	 not	 simply	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 changing	 composition	 of	 EU.	 In	 fact,	 this	 sort	 of	 pattern	 is	characteristic	of	most	waves	of	accession,	if	with	different	degrees	of	clarity	and	of	course	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 overall	 support.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 there	 is	growing	diversity	in	national	reactions	to	the	EU,	but	we	find	little	sign	of	this.		In	 looking	to	explain	these	variations	we	find	that	utilitarian	considerations	matter.	 Direct	 utilitarian	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 trade	 and	 transfer	 payments	 are	associated	with	 variation,	 as	 are	 changes	 in	 national	 economic	 performance,	with	the	 EU	 seemingly	 rewarded	 for	 good	 times.	 We	 have	 looked	 closely	 at	 various	groups	of	EU	members	after	each	accession	wave,	and	this	finding	is	quite	consistent	across	these	groups,	although	there	are	differences:	transfer	payments,	in	particular,	are	 more	 important	 in	 the	 larger	 groups	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 socialization	 is	 much	clearer	for	the	EU	6	group	of	countries	than	any	other.		If	we	look	at	this	cyclical	pattern	in	the	light	of	our	model,	we	see	clearly	that	the	model	predicts	just	this	cycle	of	surge	and	decline,	which	peaked	in	1991	around	the	 time	 of	Maastricht	 and	 reached	 a	 trough	 in	 1996,	 only	 to	 rise	 again	 to	 reach	another	 peak	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 2004	 accessions.	 Our	 model	 predicts	 just	 such	 a	pattern,	 although	 the	 first	peak	 is	1990	and	 the	 trough	 is	 in	1995.	As	 is	 typical	of	such	models,	 the	hills	and	valleys	of	our	predicted	cycle	are	also	 less	distinct	 than	are	 those	 in	 the	 real	 world.	 Perhaps	 other	 sources	 of	 explanation,	 and	 other	variables,	can	better	match	the	real	terrain,	but	the	performance	of	this	very	simple,	purely	utilitarian,	model	is	quite	impressive	at	an	aggregate	level.		
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We	have	seen	 that	 the	parameters	of	 the	model	are	 fairly	 stable	across	 the	different	 waves	 of	 accession.	 At	 this	 lower	 level	 of	 aggregation,	 within	 each	accession	wave,	the	performance	of	the	model	is	also	fairly	consistent,	at	least	to	the	extent	of	reflecting	the	general	trend	of	support	–	up,	down,	or	pretty	flat	–	in	each	of	 those	 groups.	 What	 is	 not	 explained	 are	 the	 sudden	 increases	 in	 negative	perceptions	following	entry	in	the	wave	3	countries	–	Sweden,	Finland	and	Austria.	The	predicted	trend	was	an	upward	one,	a	trend	visible	in	the	data	in	Figure	3	only	if	the	 first	entries	are	discounted.	The	equally	sharp	 increases	 in	support	 in	 the	 first	couple	of	years	of	membership	of	the	wave	2	countries	are	also	remarkable	and	not	captured	in	our	model,	although	the	broad	upward	trend	in	our	predicted	model	is	consistent	with	the	trends	in	Figure	3.		There	are	perhaps	only	 two	countries	where	 the	pattern	 is	clear	and	 is	not	consistent	 with	 our	 utilitarian	 model.	 One	 is	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	 the	 gradual	disenchantment	 with	 the	 benefits	 of	 membership	 since	 the	 early	 1990s	 is	 not	reflected	 in	 the	underlying	material	 changes.	A	more	 striking	expectation,	 and	 the	most	 striking	negative	 result	 in	our	analysis,	 is	 the	 case	of	 the	UK.	There,	 support	has	 fallen	 since	 the	 early	 1980s,	 and	 fallen	 sharply	 from	 the	 relative	 heights	achieved	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	 Predictions	 from	 our	 model	 suggest	 support	 should	have	risen	steadily,	rather	than	fallen	steadily	from	around	1993.		Leaving	the	special	case	of	the	UK	aside,	the	model	is	quite	consistent	across	member	subgroups,	but	given	the	huge	changes	that	have	taken	place	with	the	EU	since	1983	when	this	series	of	measures	started,	it	would	hardly	be	surprising	if	the	models	were	unstable	across	the	time	period	as	a	whole.	In	particular,	the	growing	
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interventions	in	macroeconomic	freedoms	that	date	from	the	early	1990s	might	well	increase	 differences	 between	 countries,	 while	 the	 growing	 scope	 of	 EU	 policy	making	 could	 lead	 to	 more	 negative	 reactions	 based	 on	 non-utilitarian	considerations.	 However,	 while	 we	 find	 limited	 evidence	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 two	distinct	periods	in	EU	(before	and	after	1993),	the	utilitarian	explanation	of	support	seems	to	remain	stable	in	time,	a	result	that	runs	counter	to	the	recent	findings	of	Eichenberg	and	Dalton	(2007).		We	 find	more	 stability	 over	 time	 and,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 national	 economic	indicators,	 a	 different	 set	 of	 significant	 effects	 than	 some	 previous	 studies	 have	found.	 It	 is	 obvious	 that	 more	 work	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 to	 resolve	 some	 of	 the	inconsistencies	 in	 results	 from	 different	 analyses.	 Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	introductory	chapter,	while	outputs	should	contribute	initially	to	what	Easton	called	‘specific’	 support,	 they	 could	 also	 –	 in	 time–	 encourage	 diffuse	 support,	 a	supposition	 behind	 the	 neo-functionalist	 interpretation	 of	 EU	 development.	 The	next	 two	chapters	 investigate	 this	 argument	 further	analysing	 the	 spill-over	effect	from	output	support	to	support	for	institutions	and	to	support	for	the	community.			
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Figure	1	Time-series	cross-section	plot	for	average	benefit	perception	in	EU	
member	states	in	a	year	with	standard	errors	shown	by	vertical	bars		
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Figure	2	Perceptions	of	benefit	from	EU	membership	in	the	founding	6	
members	and	average	perception	in	the	EU	25		 	
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Figure	3	Perceptions	of	benefit	from	EU	membership	in	the	countries	of	the	
first,	second,	and	third	accession	waves	and	average	perception	in	the	EU25			 	
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Figure	4	Perceptions	of	benefit	from	EU	membership	in	the	countries	of	the	
fourth	enlargement	wave	and	average	perception	in	the	EU	25		 	
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Figure	5	Average	perceptions	of	benefit	from	EU	membership	in	the	founding	
six	members	and	in	countries	of	subsequent	enlargement	waves			 	
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Figure	6	Standard	deviation	in	perceptions	of	benefit	from	EU	membership	
within	founding	six	members,	within	subsequent	enlargement	waves,	and	
overall	in	the	EU25			
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Table	1	Utilitarian	model	of	EU	support		
	*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001		Note:	Driscoll-Kraay	SCC	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		
EU 6 EU 9 EU 12 EU 15 EU 25
0.008 0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.013** -0.012* -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.248 -0.133 0.257 0.453* 0.422*
(0.292) (0.321) (0.200) (0.172) (0.188)
0.876** 0.530* 0.384** 0.426** 0.449**
(0.162) (0.177) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121)
0.040 -0.070 -0.127*** -0.099*** -0.094***
(0.044) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
-0.258* 0.044 0.119*** 0.065* 0.059*
(0.097) (0.061) (0.008) (0.024) (0.022)
0.612 0.862* 1.339*** 1.208*** 1.172***
(0.287) (0.288) (0.216) (0.195) (0.215)
R-sq (within) 0.461 0.166 0.390 0.352 0.342
RMSE 0.048 0.060 0.062 0.061 0.061
N 132 198 260 293 313
log(income)
socialisation
constant
inflation
unemployment
transfers
trade
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Figure	7	Estimation	results	of	the	utilitarian	model	after	each	accession	wave.		Note:	95%	confidence	interval	around	coefficients	for	each	standardized	variable.
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Appendix	
	
EU25	in-sample	data	summary	
			
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall 0.5608 0.1537 0.1442 0.8701 N =     313
between 0.1307 0.2575 0.8022 n =      25
within 0.0713 0.2370 0.7881 mean t =   12.52
overall 3.6114 3.3809 -0.7078 23.0211 N =     313
between 2.0664 1.0962 10.7123 n =      25
within 2.4617 -4.4641 15.9202 mean t =   12.52
overall 8.5804 4.1016 1.5000 23.9000 N =     313
between 3.8460 2.6682 18.3500 n =      25
within 2.3592 0.7954 16.0304 mean t =   12.52
overall 0.0077 0.0159 -0.0100 0.0624 N =     313
between 0.0114 -0.0055 0.0331 n =      25
within 0.0087 -0.0262 0.0463 mean t =   12.52
overall 0.6642 0.0787 0.4962 0.8568 N =     313
between 0.0783 0.5443 0.8280 n =      25
within 0.0330 0.5641 0.7440 mean t =   12.52
overall 9.9204 0.3764 8.9807 11.2195 N =     313
between 0.2478 9.4597 10.4606 n =      25
within 0.2950 9.0855 10.7461 mean t =   12.52
overall 2.8212 1.0523 0.0000 3.8918 N =     313
between 1.4004 0.3466 3.6367 n =      25
within 0.4377 0.7044 3.7001 mean t =   12.52
overall 0.5490 0.1120 0.2754 0.9257 N =     313
between 0.0935 0.3838 0.6923 n =      25
within 0.0603 0.3894 0.8359 mean t =   12.52
EU feeling
benefit
inflation
unemployment
transfers
trade
log(income)
socialisation
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